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CHAPTER 13 
Labor Relations 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
A. FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
§13.1. National labor relations law: Union general laws and fore-
men clauses. In International Typographical Union, Local 38, AFL-
CIO and International Typographical Union, Local 165, AFL-CIO v. 
NLRB,1 the Supreme Court of the United States passed upon the 
legality of the two newspaper strikes by the locals of the ITU in 
Worcester and Haverhill, Massachusetts, under the National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended.2 The decisions in the ITU cases by the 
Court represent the climax of fourteen years of litigation by the NLRB 
and the ITU and involve various clauses in the ITU contracts, in-
cluding the general laws and foremen clauses.3 In the Massachusetts 
case, the Court reversed the National Labor Board's decision,4 enforced 
in part by the First Circuit,1S that a demand for a contract that in-
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§13.1. 1 365 U.S. 705, 81 Sup. Ct. 855, 6 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1961). 
229 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1958). 
31TU v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 705, 81 Sup. Ct. 855, 6 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1961); NLRB v. 
News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695, 81 Sup. Ct. 849, 6 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1961); American 
Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 73 Sup. Ct. 552, 97 L. Ed. 852 
(1953); NLRB v. News Syndicate, Inc., 279 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1960); ITU v. NLRB, 
278 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1960); Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd. v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 567 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959); American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 
1951); Alpert v. ITU, 161 F. Supp. 427 (D. Mass. 1958); Evans v. ITU, 81 F. Supp. 
675 (S.D. Ind. 1948); Hillboro Newspaper Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 591 (1960); Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin, 123 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959); News Syndicate and New York Mailer's 
Union No.6, 122 N.L.R.B. 818 (1959); Kansas City Star Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 972 (1957); 
Union Employers Section of the Printing Industry of America, 87 N.L.R.B. 1418 
(1949); Baltimore Graphic Arts Assn., 87 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1949); Chicago Newspaper 
Publishers Assn., 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949); American Newspaper Publishers Assn., 
86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949). 
4123 N.L.R.B. 806 (1959). 
II 278 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1960). 
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corporates within its tenns those general laws of the union that are 
"not in conflict with state or federal law" was a refusal to bargain 
collectively within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) and that a strike 
for this clause was an attempt to cause the employer to discriminate 
contrary to Section8(b)(2) of the act. The Court reasoned that any 
rule or regulation in the general laws of the union that permitted or 
required illegal discrimination or other unlawful action would be 
excluded from incorporation by the very terms of the contractual 
clause. At the same time, by an equal division (4-4), the Court affirmed 
the Circuit Court's holding that a strike for a clause requiring foremen, 
who are charged with the authority to hire new employees, to be 
union members is violative of Section 8(b)(I)(B) in that it restrains and 
coerces the employer in the selection of his representatives for the 
adjustment of grievances. This finding was reached notwithstanding 
the contractual safeguards that the union "shall not discipline the 
foremen for carrying out written instructions of the publisher." 
The lTV cases are to be distinguished from NLRB v. News Syndicate 
CO.,6 decided the same day, in which the Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Second Circuit7 that the inclusion of the foremen's 
clause into a collective bargaining agreement was not unlawful. The 
Court stated that "we will not assume that unions and employers will 
violate the federal law, favoring discrimination in favor of union 
members against the clear command of this Act of Congress." 8 Thus 
the Supreme Court finds itself in the somewhat anomalous situation of 
allowing a foremen's clause to be part of a negotiated contract while 
at the same time refusing to allow a strike for the purpose of obtaining 
such a legal clause.9 
§13.2. National Labor Relations Board: Hiring halls. On the 
same day as it decided the lTV cases, the Supreme Court further 
curbed the powers of the National Labor Relations Board. In Local 
60, Carpenters v. NLRB 1 the Court overruled the Brown-Olds2 remedy 
requiring the refunding of dues, assessments, and work permit fees to· 
all employees over a six-month period when these monies were paid 
to the union under an unlawful preferential hiring hall clause in an 
agreement in which no coercion or intimidation of the employees was 
proved_ The Court held that this remedy was punitive, not remedial, 
and therefore beyond the power of the board. By this decision, the 
Brown-Olds remedy can only be used when a company union itself 
is unlawfully created, as in Virginia Electric Co. v. NLRB,3 or when 
6365 U.S. 695, 81 Sup. Ct. 849, 6 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1961). 
7279 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1960). 
8365 U.S. 695,699,81 Sup. Ct. 849, 852, 6 L. Ed. 2d 29, 33 (1961). 
9 See also Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93. 
18 Sup. Ct. lOll, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1186 (1958). 
§13.2. 1365 U.S. 651,81 Sup. Ct. 875, 6 L. Ed. 2d I (1961). 
2115 N.L.R.B. 599 (1956) . 
.3 319 U.S. 533, 63 Sup. Ct. 1214,87 L. Ed. 1568 (1943). 
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it is specifically proved that the employees are, in fact, coerced into 
joining the union. 
In Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB,4 the Supreme Court reversed the 
board's Mountain Pacifici' doctrine, which held that hiring hall provi-
sions were in violation of Sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) of the act unless 
they contained certain protective clauses required by the board.s The 
Court held that the requirements laid down by the board were not 
necessary to validate a union-run hiring hall clause that included a 
provision that the clause depended on actual seniority irrespective of 
union membership. Although the Court noted that the existence 
of the hiring hall clause probably did encourage union membership, it 
concluded that the only encouragement of union membership banned 
by the law was that which is "accomplished by discrimination." In 
order to prove violations of the two sections of the law, the board "is 
confined to determining whether discrimination has in fact been 
practiced." '( 
§I3.3. Union expenditures for political purposes. Although not 
involving labor relations, there were two other major decisions by the 
Supreme Court in the labor field. In lAM v. Street,! in which there 
were five opinions, the Court by a 5-4 decision avoided the constitu-
tional question and held that a union under the Railway Labor Act2 
may not spend a member's dues over his protests for political purposes 
opposed by the member. 
Since the majority opinion relied heavily upon the specific purposes 
and legislative history of the Railway Labor Act and its 1951 amend-
ment,a which first permitted a union shop in the railroad industry, the 
questions of political expenditures by unions when a lesser security 
arrangement exists or of such spending by unions beyond the scope 
of the Railway Labor Act were left unanswered. Two Justices (Doug-
las and Black) separately indicated that a union's expenditures of the 
dues of an unwilling member for political purposes violated his con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech. 
The question of the relief to be granted to such protesting union 
members troubled the Court. The majority decided that only if a 
member files a protest against a particular expenditure could he 
recover, and provided that this recovery be limited to the same propor-
tion of his dues as the opposed expenditure bears to the union's total 
4565 U.S. 667, 81 Sup. Ct. 855, 6 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1961). 
~ 119 N.L.R.B. 885 (1957). 
8 The board required provisions that: {I) hiring be on a nondiscriminatory basis; 
(2) the employer retain the right to reject union referrals; (5) the parties post notices 
of the hiring arrangements, including the board's "safeguards." 
'i 565 U.S. 667, 677, 81 Sup. Ct. 855, 840, 6 L. Ed. 2d 11, 17 (1961). 
§15.5. 1567 U.S. 740, 81 Sup. Ct. 1784, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141,48 L.R.R.M. 2345 (1961). 
245 U.s.C. §§151 et seq. (1958). 
a Pub. L. No. 914, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. Gan. 10, 1951), 64 Stat. 1258. The amend-
ment was upheld against an attack under the First and Fifth Amendments in 
Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 551 U.S. 225, 76 Sup. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 
1ll2, 58 LA.R.M. 2099 (1956). 
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expenditures. In so holding, the Court reversed the Supreme Court 
of Georgia's issuance of a blanket restraining order against the union's 
collection of all funds4 as being contrary to the reasons for the creation 
of the union shop clause in the Railway Labor Act. 
The majority emphasized that its holding is subject to two important 
limitations: (1) it does not outlaw the union shop contract that compels 
payment of the dues to the union, and (2) it involves no curtailment 
of the traditional political activities of the railroad unions, but means 
only that these unions must not support those activities against the 
expressed wishes of a dissenting employee with his dues. 
The four other opinions in the case should be noted: (1) A con-
curring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the use of the 
union member's dues for political purposes to which he objects would 
infringe free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, and he 
also questioned the "proportional" relief although he went along to 
provide a majority holding. (2) Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred in 
part and dissented in part, and disagreed with the remedies of the 
majority, for he believed that the only practical remedy was the Georgia 
courts' injunction against the enforcement of the union shop clause. 
(3) Mr. Justice Black dissented and found the application of the union 
shop to the protesting employees a violation of the First Amendment. 
He would have modified the injunction to forbid use of the union shop 
clause to bar employment of the protesting employees. (4) Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter (with whom Mr. Justice Harlan joined) dissented. He did 
not regard the union's use of the dues for political purposes to which 
the members objected as violating either the Railway Act or the 
Constitution. 
§13.4. Sunday laws. In the final United States Supreme Court case 
to be discussed, labor's interests in a common day of rest and in pro-
tecting standards were involved, for the Sunday laws of the Common· 
wealth of Massachusetts were at stake. In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher 
Super Market of Mass., Inc.1 the Supreme Court was faced with two 
objections to the validity of the Sunday laws of Massachusetts: (1) the 
law, as written,2 contains within it such varied exceptions as to make it 
arbitrary and without rational bases; and (2) the statute is violative 
of the First Amendment in that it is a law respecting an establishment 
of religion, and also that it prohibits the free exercise thereof. The 
Court, by a divided vote, held that since some reasonable bases for 
the exceptions to the statute were shown and since the law does not 
require mathematical nicety or the prevention of all inequality,3 
the classifications drawn in the statute do not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. 
4215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959). 
§13.4. 1366 U.S. 617, 81 Sup. Ct. 1122, 6 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1961), also noted in 
§10.3 supra. 
2 G.L., c. 136. 
3 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 337, 341, 55 
L. Ed. 369, 377 (1911). 
4
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As to the First Amendment objections, the Court held that the 
purpose or effect of the statute is secular rather than religious and that 
the law" ... simply regulates a secular activity and ... operates so 
as to make the practice of their [appellees'] religious beliefs more 
expensive." 4 This regulation, it was held, is "wholly different than 
when the legislation attempts to make a religious practice itself unlaw-
ful.'" 5 Thus the Supreme Court, reversing the Federal District Court,6 
held that the Massachusetts Sunday law violates neither the First nor 
the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.7 
As a result of this decision, the Governor has appointed the "Suther-
land Commission" to review General Laws, Chapter 136, the 50-
called Sunday laws of the Commonwealth. 
§13.5. Secondary boycott. The federal courts in Massachusetts 
handed down several decisions in the labor field during the 1961 
SURVEY year. For the most part these involved the federal labor law, 
but they also dealt with arbitration awards, and several are noted 
below. 
In a secondary boycott case of first impression, in which the general 
counsel sought to enjoin the union from alleged violations of the new 
Sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the LMRA, the District Court, 
in Alpert v. Local 379, Teamsters,l was faced with the problem of the 
interpretation to be given to the new clause " ... any individual 
employed by any person ... " in Section 8(b)(4), as amended by the 
LMRA of 1959. 
In the first of the two alleged violations, the union had approached 
the project superintendent, an employee of a union general contractor, 
calling to his attention the fact that a certain subcontractor was em-
ploying suspended union members and paying less than union scale 
wages, although the general contractor's contract had a "hot cargo" 
clause forbidding this. Shortly thereafter the project superintendent, 
acting within his authority, terminated the arrangement with the 
subcontractor. 
The court (Wyzanski, J.) found not the slightest basis "for holding 
that the provisions of §8(b)(4)(ii) had been violated." Further, and 
more importantly, it was held that the above incident did not violate 
Section 8(b)(4)(i) for two reasons. First, the union did not induce the 
project superintendent not to use, handle, or work on goods, or not to 
perform services. 
4 Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 Sup. Ct. ll44, ll47, 6 L. Ed. 2d 563, 
567 (1961). 
I) Ibid. 
6176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959). 
7 On the same day that the United States Supreme Court decided the Massa-
chusetts case, it also upheld the Sunday laws of Pennsylvania and Maryland in 
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc_ v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 Sup. Ct. 
ll35, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1961), and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 Sup_ Ct. 
lOll, ll53, 1218, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961), the latter being the basic opinion upon the 
broad issues. 
§13.5. 1184 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1960). 
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Only in a colloquial sense can it be said that ... [the project 
superintendent] was using [subcontractor's] trucks. Section 
8(b)(4)(i) is concerned with appeals addressed to those who per-
fonn services manually or clerically, or who manually use goods, 
or who have minor supervisory functions. It does not cover 
appeals to those who on behalf of their employer have power 
lawfully to terminate, cease, or otherwise control business relations 
with the so-called primary employer. 
Second, the addressing of noncoercive pleas to employers or those who 
have authority to make and terminate contracts on behalf of such 
employers is protected by the First Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution and more specifically by Section 8(c) of the act. 
Thus, since the union appeal was directed at the enforcement of a 
so-called hot cargo agreement which, under Section 8(e) of the act, was 
specifically pennitted and since the interpretation given to Section 
8(b)(4)(i) was less than its literal meaning, the union's actions were not 
enjoined.2 
At the same time, the court found that the union on a different 
project had violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the act by threatening 
several contractors who terminated the use of the nonunion trucks on 
the job. The court issued an injunction against the repetition of such 
threats and coercive tactics by the union. 
§13.6. Illegal picketing. In Greene v. Local Joint Executive 
Board/ the court affinned the issuance of a temporary injunction 
against picketing or threats of picketing by a noncertified union that 
had within the previous nine months overwhelmingly lost a certifica-
tion election. The court found that the object of the picketing was to 
force the employer to recognize the union and to force the employees 
to accept the union as their bargaining representative in violation of 
the new Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the LMRA, as amended. 
§13.7. Representation elections. In companion cases, My Bread 
Baking Co. v. Alpert and 20th Century Bakers Union v. Alpert,1 the 
District Court (Julian, J.) held that neither the employer nor the 
incumbent union was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the 
holding of a representation election directed to be held by the NLRB, 
since the existing collective bargaining agreement did not bar such an 
election. The regional director's withdrawal of a former dismissal of a 
second union's petition for such an election did not violate any con-
stitutional or statutory requirements. 
§13.8. Arbitration: Arbitrable issues. The District Court, in U A W 
v. Waltham Screw Co./ allowed the plaintiff union's motion for sum-
2 For a discussion of the new Section 8(b)(4)(i) of the amended federal law, see 
Previant, The New Hot Cargo and Secondary Boycott Sections, 48 Geo. L.J. 346·349 
(1959); Segal, Supervisors in Secondary Boycotts, Symposium on the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 869 (Tulane University, 1961). 
§13.6. 147 L.R.R.M. 2690 (D. Mass. 1961). 
§13.7. 1197 F. Supp. 668 (D. Mass. 1961). 
§13.8. 147 L.R.R.M. 2196 (D. Mass. 1960). 
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mary judgment on an arbitration award of two grievances. The 
grievances filed concerned disciplinary action by the company against 
an employee and the right of a nonworking foreman, by working, to 
deprive an employee of overtime wages he would otherwise have 
earned. The company claimed that the issues involved were not 
arbitrable and protested the holding of the arbitration hearings. The 
hearings were held, however, and awards favorable to the union in both 
instances were made. The court, in a discussion of the issues open 
to it in a Section 301(a) enforcement of a collective bargaining contract 
case, indicated that such issues "must be strictly confined to the ques-
tion whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate or did agree to 
give the arbitrator power to make the award he made." 2 The court 
stated that since the contract provided that "either party shall have 
the right to refer any question involving interpretation or application 
of the provisions of this agreement . . . to arbitration'" and the ques-
tions in issue arose relative to job classification and disciplinary action, 
subjects which were covered by the contract and which "clearly 
involve" the interpretation of contract provisions, they were therefore 
arbitrable. 
§13.9. Refusal to bargain. The First Circuit dealt with two NLRB 
cases, one arbitration matter, and a federal pre-emption problem dur-
ing the 1961 SURVEY year. In Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. 
NLRB,1 the court reversed the board's ruling that the failure of the 
employer to meet the union's request for information concerning 
the cost of a noncontributory group insurance program was a refusal to, 
bargain under Section 8(a)(5) of the law. Although the court agreed 
with the board that benefits from the insurance plan constituted wages 
(a negotiable subject under the law), it rejected the board's view that 
the cost of the plan also constituted wages and held that "while no 
doubt employer costs affect wages, a direct relationship between them 
is at best speculative and not in accord with business economy or 
thinking." 2 It should be noted that the employer at no time rested its 
refusal to furnish the requested cost information upon the grounds 
that it would be financially unable to paya and that the union de-
manded the information on the grounds that knowledge of the cost 
was necessary before it could fairly evaluate its over-all bargaining 
position. The court rejected this argument by use of the "direct 
relationship" theory of the Cross case4 but expressly reserved judgment 
on the question whether the employer could resist similar demands 
2 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Be Gulf Navigation Co., lI6l1 U.S. 
574, 582, 80 Sup. Ct. IM7, Il15l1, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409, 1417, 46 L.R.R.M. 2416, 2419 
(1960). For a discussion of this and other arbitration cases, see 1960 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §I4.1. 
§ll1.9. 1291 F.2d 128,48 L.R.R.M. 2l11l1 (1st Cir. 1961). 
2 W. W. Cross Be Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 24 L.R.R.M. 2068 (1st Cir. 1949). 
a NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., lI51 U.s. 149, 76 Sup. Ct. 75l1, 100 L. Ed. 
1027, lI8 L.R.R.M. 2042 (1956). 
4 W. W. Cross Be Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949). 
7
Segal: Chapter 13: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
128 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §12.5 
tions;1 the other creates a "division of urban and industrial renewal," 
for the stated purpose of encouraging and fostering renewal and re-
development projects.2 Although the two thus focus on somewhat 
different aspects of the by now quite old problems of slum and blight, 
if the words are still permitted in a legal- even if not polite - so-
ciety,S they nevertheless lend themselves to comparison at some points. 
Like Gaul, both acts divide the realm of concern into three parts, 
"blighted open area," "decadent area," and "substandard area." In the 
past, proposed projects have sometimes foundered on whether clear-
ance of the area in question preliminary to its redevelopment con-
stituted the requisite public purpose. Undeveloped areas, in particu-
lar, raised questions which troubled courts. The new statutory 
definitions eliminate the possibility that such an attack could be suc-
cessful in the future on the grounds of ultra vires. The statute in-
corporates not only every physical inadequacy of existing develop-
ment, but its legal adequacy as well. 
The legislature has also picked up the cue dropped by the judiciary. 
An advisory opinion4 upheld the urban renewal provisions under 
attack. It distinguished a prior decision urged as contrary partly on 
the ground that the later contract limits the profit of the developer 
to 6 percent, which the Court held constituted adequate "public pur-
pose." Section 9 of Chapter 652 accordingly insures that future 
contracts will pass the public purpose test by limiting the developer's 
net income from any project to an average of 6 percent per annum. 
One curious but extremely interesting difference in approach exists 
between the two acts. The act pertaining to redevelopment corpora-
tions abolished the city planning board of the city of Boston and 
transferred its powers, property, and employees to the Boston Rede-
velopment Authority. These powers, however, are made subordinate 
to the veto power of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority in matters 
touching the plans of the latter body for extending the Massachusetts 
Turnpike. 
This provision should be contrasted with Section 7 of the act 
establishing a division of urban and industrial renewal. It, far from 
undermining or derogating from the authority of planning boards, 
requires the division, as a condition precedent to approving any urban 
renewal plan, to ascertain that the planning board for the area of the 
proposed sites has found that the project "conforms to a comprehensive 
plan for the locality as a whole." A sequel to this act has already 
been written by the judiciary .under the title of Simonian v. Boston 
Redevelopment Authority.1S The plaintiff had been the top-ranking 
§12.5. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 652. 
2 Id., c. 776. 
3 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1961. 
4 See Opinion of the Justices, 841 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960). See also 
Dodge v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 14711, 179 N.E.2d 
234. 
IS 842 Mass. 5711, 174 N.E.2d 429 (1961). See §18.6 infra for further comment 
on this case. 
8
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when and if the union should request increased coverage within the 
framework of the existing noncontributory insurance system. 
§13.10. Discrimination to discourage union membership. In an-
other case, NLRB v. Corning Glass Works,! the First Circuit agreed 
with the board that a refusal to hire a union "trouble maker" may 
have been a violation of the law, Section 8(a)(I), but that it did not 
constitute an unlawful discrimination to discourage union membership 
under Section 8(a)(3) of the act. In the case, the employee had been a 
leader in a widely publicized strike at another plant in the area. When 
he was replaced during the strike, he applied for a temporary job 
with the employer but was informed that his recent notoriety would 
probably make it difficult for him to obtain a job anywhere in the 
vicinity. The court noted the friendly and cooperative relationship 
between the union and the employer and reversed the board's finding 
that the incident would discourage union membership at the plant. 
At the same time, the court agreed that it might have the effect of 
making the union members a little more restrained in their behavior 
and therefore constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the act. 
§13.1l. Arbitration: Local understanding clause. In Local 201, 
IUE v. General Electric CO.,1 the union sought to compel arbitration 
on a grievance alleged to have resulted from the employer's violation 
of a "local understanding." The collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided that the existence of, or any violation of, a local understanding 
would not be the basis of arbitration unless the understanding was in 
writing and signed by the company and the union. The understanding 
in issue was in writing but signed only by the company. The First 
Circuit rejected the analogy to the statute of frauds' memorandum 
situation and refused to apply the broader language of United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior 6' Gulf Navigation CO.2 The Circuit 
Court held that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot 
be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
agreed so to submit." The failure of the local to sign the writing 
indicated a failure to comply with the basic terms of the collective 
bargaining contract. Therefore the company could not be required 
to arbitrate on a contractual basis. 
§13.12. Pre-emption: Collective bargaining. In an important case 
involving the problem of federal pre-emption, the First Circuit re-
versed the District Court in General Electric Co. v. Callahan,1 and 
held that the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration 
could not hold a hearing under a state law to assess blame for the 
continuance of a labor dispute between the company and Local 142, 
American Federation of Technical Engineers, AFL-CIO. The case 
arose from the six-week strike which ended November 10, 1960, when 
§1!1.10. 148 L.R.R.M. 2759 (1st Cir. 1961). 
§13.11. 1283 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1960). 
2363 u.s. 574, 80 Sup. Ct. 1347,4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960). 
§IU2. 1294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961). 
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the 600 draftsmen and designers returned to work under a truce 
agreement pending further efforts to reach agreement on a new 
contract. When the Governor and the union requested the state board 
of conciliation to hold a hearing under the old state statute2 to arbi-
trate the issues involved in the labor dispute, the company refused to 
arbitrate and sought a federal court injunction against the state board 
on the ground that the state agency had no jurisdiction as interstate 
commerce activities were involved and the federal law of collective 
bargaining had pre-empted the field. The Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court's refusal to grant an injunction and stated: 
That state board action pursuant to the Massachusetts statute 
would conflict with the national policy of free and unfettered 
collective bargaining is clear . .. The obvious statutory purpose 
is to coerce agreement by invoking official action to mold public 
opinion with respect to a labor dispute to the end of bringing 
the pressure of public opinion to bear to force a settlement.3 
The effect of this decision is to minimize the importance of Chapter 
150 of the General Laws insofar as it deals with assessing blame and 
arbitrations signed by one party in a labor dispute involving interstate 
commerce, and to point up again the sweep of federal pre-emption in 
the field of labor relations, particularly in collective bargaining.4 
B. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§13.13. Pre-emption: Concurrent enforcement of agreements. The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was primarily concerned 
with problems relating to federal pre-emption under Section 301(A) of 
LMRA during the 1961 SURVEY year.! 
In Courtney v. Charles Dowd Box CO.,2 the plaintiff employee 
brought a bill in equity to enforce a collective bargaining agreement 
with the employer. In rejecting the employer's motion to dismiss, 
which motion was brought on the grounds that Congress intended to 
occupy the field, the Court held that "in the absence of a clear holding 
by the Supreme Court . . . that federal jurisdiction has been made 
exclusive, we shall not make what would be tantamount to an abdica-
tion of the hitherto undoubted jurisdiction of our own courts." Thus 
there was and still remains "concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state 
2 G.L., c. 150, §§3, 5, and 6, enacted originally in 1886 but amended several times 
up to as recently as 1939. 
B 294 F.2d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 1961). 
4 For the position of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on several 
areas of pre-emption, see §14.l3 infra. The problem of pre-emption is discussed 
in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.3, 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.9, and footnotes 
cited therein. 
§13.13. ! For a discussion of this issue, see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Con-
gress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 276-281 
(1959). 
2341 Mass. 337, 169 N.E.2d 885 (1960), also noted in §10.6 supra. 
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courts over suits for the enforcement of a collective bargaining agree-
ment in this Commonwealth." A petition for certiorari has been 
filed in this case with the United States Supreme Court and the state 
court decision has been affirmed.3 
In Caton v. Reuther,4 the plaintiffs, members of Local 901 of the 
International UA W, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the transfer 
of the local's assets to the international and demanded an accounting 
and damages for a breach of an alleged promise to obtain severance 
pay from the company when Ford closed its Somerville plant. The 
Superior Court had sustained the defendant's demurrers and pleas in 
abatement and to the jurisdiction relying on federal pre-emption, the 
requirements of the labor dispute statute,!> and other defenses. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and held that this case between 
members of the local and the officers of the international 
. . . is not a controversy arising out of any demand of any 
character ... concerning terms or conditions of employment; or 
concerning the association ... of persons in negotiating terms 
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants 
stand in proximate relation of employer and employee. 
This is so even admitting that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs 
"have some connection with past labor controversies." 
As to the federal pre-emption defense, the Court reasserted its 
Dowd Box CO.6 holding and maintained the continuance of concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal courts pending a clear denial of this 
position by the United States Supreme Court. In addition the Court 
reiterated its position that an international union can be sued in the 
Commonwealth by service upon an international officer or representa-
tive provided he has adequate powers and is sufficiently under the 
direction of the governing bodies and principal officers of the inter-
national to be fairly representative of its membership. Property 
of the international union in Massachusetts can be used for any 
debts "for which all that union's members were liable" and "substituted 
service under Rule 14 of the Superior Court (1954) would permit ap-
plication of this property quasi in rem." 7 
§13.14. Arbitration: Binding effect of decree. In Hannan v. Enter-
prise Publishing CO.1 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an arbitra-
tion award that refused to reinstate an employee who was fired for 
"gross misconduct while on duty'" as allowed by the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In ruling on the employee's bill for declaratory relief, 
the Court held: "In the absence of fraud an arbitration decision is 
8 See discussion in §10.6 supra. 
4341 Mass. 547,170 N.E.2d 8!15 (1960). 
Ii G.L., c. 214, §9A. 
6541 Mass. !I!I7, 169 N.E. 2d 885 (1960). 
7 See Donahue v. Kenney, !l27 Mass. 409, 41!1, 99 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1951). 
§l!l.I4. 1341 Mass. !l6!1, 169 N.E.2d 894 (1960). 
11
Segal: Chapter 13: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
150 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.15 
binding though there may have been committed an error of law or 
fact in reaching that decision." However, the Court did agree that 
an aggrieved employee is entitled to a binding declaration of his 
individual rights under the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment but that the employee "has no further rights under the union 
management agreement." At the same time, the Hannan case restates 
the central thesis of Kesslen Bros. Inc. v. Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration;2 since the award dates from February, 1954, the new 
arbitration actS was not applied although the same result would have 
been reached.4 
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
§13.15. Minimum wage law'! The Congress amended the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 to change the $1.00 per hour minimum 
rate to $1.15 per hour effective September 3, 1961, and $1.25 per hour 
effective September 3, 1963.2 In addition, new coverage was provided 
for over 3.5 million persons formerly exempt in such fields as retailing, 
construction, gas stations, seafood processing, local transit, telephone 
exchanges, and seamen. The schedule for the newly covered employees 
is as follows: (1) beginning September 3, 1961, $1.00 per hour minimum 
for all hours worked with no overtime pay required; (2) beginning 
September 3, 1963, $1.00 per hour minimum and overtime after 
forty-four hours per week; (3) beginning September 3, 1954, $1.15 per 
hour minimum and overtime after forty-two hours per week; and (4) 
on and after September 3, 1965, $1.25 per hour minimum and overtime 
after forty hours per week.s 
The extended coverage of the new law covers five major categories 
of "enterprises" engaged in interstate commerce or the production of 
goods for interstate commerce.4 The first category includes an enter-
prise which has one or more retail or service establishments if the gross 
annual volume of sales is not less than $1 million; also the enterprise 
must purchase or receive goods for resale that move or have moved 
across state lines which amount in total volume to $250,000. The 
second category includes any enterprise engaged in an interurban or 
metropolitan transit business. Here again the gross annual volume 
of sales must not be less than $1 million. A third group consists of any 
establishment of an enterprise not included above which has employees 
2339 Mass. 301, 158 N.E.2d 871 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1l.7, 
13.12. 
S Acts of 1959, c. 546. 
4 See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.17. 
§13.15. 1 A useful summary of the new act can be found in United States De-
partment of Labor, Fair Labor Standards Act, Handy Reference Guide (1961). 
2 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65, §6(a) 
(May 5, 1961). 
S 75 Stat. 65, §§6(b), 7. 
4 Id. §§3(r), 3(s). 
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engaged in commerce or production of goods for commerce if the 
annual gross volume of sales is not less than $1 million. The final two 
categories consist of (1) an enterprise in construction or reconstruction 
if annual volume from business is not less than $350,000, and (2) any 
gasoline service establishment if the annual gross volume of sales is not 
less than $250,000. 
Two other provisions of the amending act are worthy of note. 
First, the protection of the child labor provisions is extended to enter-
prises "engaged in commerce or in production of goods for com-
merce." 5 Second, the courts are authorized, in an injunction pro-
ceeding, to order the payment of minimum wages or overtime 
compensation found by the courts to be owing the employees.6 
At the same time, the minimum wage and overtime provisions are 
not made applicable to twenty-two specific categories ranging from 
employees in the laundering and cleaning, theater, hotel, and fishing 
industries to employees of hospitals, taxicab operators, and seamen on 
foreign vessels.7 In addition, the overtime provisions do not apply 
to eleven specific categories,s some of which were covered under the 
original law, such as announcers, news editors, and chief engineers of 
certain nonmetropolitan broadcasting stations. 
D. 1960 MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§13.16. Imported labor replacements. As noted in the 1960 
ANNUAL SURVEY,l four legislative acts were passed in the final weeks 
of the long 1960 legislative session, too late for inclusion in the 1960 
edition. 
Chapter 738 of the Acts of 1960 added a new Chapter 150D to the 
General Laws and provides for the registration of imported labor 
replacements in labor disputes. The statute represents a drive ini-
tiated by the International Typographical Union and has resulted in 
some form of legislation in approximately twenty states. The statute 
declares that it is the legislative policy of the Commonwealth that the 
employment of nonresidents as strikebreakers or labor replacements 
during a labor dispute tends to produce and prolong industrial strife 
and violence. It requires registration and detailed reporting, within 
five days, to the Commissioner of Labor of the arrangements for 
importation. It prohibits the importation of any person convicted of a 
felony within the previous seven years, and it provides criminal penal-
ties for violation of the new law.2 
§13.I7. Extension of Sunday laws. The Sunday laws were extended 
5 Id. §12(c). 
6Id.§17. 
7 Id. §13(a). 
8 Id. §13(b). 
§1!l.16. 1 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l0 n.2. 
2 For a discussion of this statute, see Segal, 1960 Labor Legislation in Massa-
chusetts, 5 Boston B.J. 16 (Jan. 1961). 
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to seven and one-half legal holidays by Chapter 812 of the Acts of 
1960. The new law added new Section 88 to the so-called Lord's Day 
law! and provides that all the restrictions of the Sunday laws relative 
to work and the closings of business are applicable to seven legal 
holidays (New Year's, May 30, July 4, Labor Day, November 11, 
Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day) and to October 12 between 
7:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M.2 
§13.18. Minimum wage law. The state minimum wage law was 
amended to include a provision for the payment of time and one half 
the employee's regular rate for work in excess of forty hours in one 
week.! The new law amended Chapter 151 of the General Laws by 
adding Section lA but listed seventeen exemptions from the new 
requirements.2 Although the penalty provisionss are not made ap· 
plicable to the new section, the individual employee may have his own 
rights to sue for violations of the new statute. Unlike the detailed 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act4 (which was amended by Congress 
§13.17. 1 G.L., c. 136. 
2 For a discussion of the Massachusetts Sunday laws, see §§1O.3, 13.4 supra. 
§13.B. 1 Acts of 1960, c. B13. 
2 The seventeen exceptions listed in the 1960 act are as follows: 
I. A janitor or caretaker of residential property, who when furnished with living 
quarters is paid a wage of not less than $30 per week; 
2. A golf caddy, newsboy, or child actor or performer; 
3. A bona fide executive, or administrative or professional person earning more 
than $BO per week; 
4. An outside salesman or outside buyer; 
5. A learner, apprentice, or handicapped person under a special license as pro· 
vided in §9; 
6. A fisherman or a person employed in the catching or taking of any kind of 
fish, shellfish, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life; 
7. A switchboard operator in a public telephone exchange; 
B. A driver or helper on a truck with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce 
Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service 
pursuant to the provisions of §204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, or as employee 
of an employer subject to the provisions of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act 
or subject to Title II of the Railway Labor Act; 
9. A business open only during June, July, August, and September of each year 
and determined by the Commissioner of Labor and Industries to be seasonal in 
nature; 
10. A seaman; 
II. An employer licensed and regulated pursuant to Chapter 159A of the General 
Laws; 
12. Any occupation subject to a mandatory minimum fair wage order, which pro· 
vides for compensation of not less than time and one half of an employee's regular 
rate for hours worked weekly in excess of forty; 
13. A hotel, motel, motor court, or like establishment; 
14. A gasoline station; 
15. Restaurants; 
16. A garageman; 
17. A hospital, sanatorium, convalescent or nursing home, infirmary or rest home. 
S G.L., c. 151, §19. 
429 U.S.C. §§20l·219 (195B), as amended. 
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during the 1961 SURVEY year),5 the state overtime law is a misleadingly 
simple one embodied in a single paragraph but applicable to all 
industries in the Commonwealth except those specifically exempted 
under one of the seventeen sections. The full impact of the law will 
not be felt until the state Department of Labor and Industries starts 
a full-scale enforcement drive following its early educational program. 
§13.19. Detectives and guard agencies. Chapter 802 of the Acts of 
1960 further regulated the business of private detectives and guard 
agencies that are required to be licensed in Massachusetts. Insofar as 
labor matters are concerned, the statute prohibits a licensee from 
engaging in labor relations activities ranging from interference with 
picketing, union organization, or collective bargaining, to labor spying, 
recruiting in a strike, or furnishing armed guards on a highway for 
persons involved in a labor dispute. 
E. 1961 MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§13.20. Prevailing wage law. In one of the shortest sessions in 
modern history, the state legislature in 1961 disposed of more than one 
hundred labor measures by enacting a number of miscellaneous acts, 
none of which is in the field of labor relations. Although the legis-
lature considered measures relative to picketing,l extension of the 
Slichter law,2 and the three-judge panellaw,3 the only measures enacted 
dealt with amendments to the prevailing wage, unemployment com-
pensation, and minimum wage laws, and Chapter 149 of the General 
Laws. 
The state prevailing wage law applicable to public works was 
amended in two respects.4 First, it now provides that a contractor is 
barred from receiving public contracts for three years after a second 
court conviction of the same section of the statute; second, the installa-
tion of resilient flooring and painting of public buildings and public 
works are now covered by the prevailing wage law. 
§13.21. Employment security. In the unemployment compensation 
field, the taxable base for the employer's contributions was increased 
from $3000 to $3600 to help increase the insurance fund and to prevent 
the suspension of merit rating.1 Two clarifying amendments to the 
employment security law were adopted.2 Another amendment re-
{; Pub. L. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (1961), noted in §13.l5 supra. 
§13.20. 1 S. 233 and S. 216. 
2H.2693. 
3 See Thirty·seventh Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144, pp. 12-14 
(1961). 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 475. 
§13.21. 1 Acts of 1961, c. 614. 
2 Chapter 247 of the Acts of 1961 provides that a person out on a labor dispute 
must earn $650 (rather than $500) from his new employer before he qualifies for 
benefits. Chapter 393 of the Acts of 1961 clarifies the term "employment" in the 
law. 
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quires the employer and a labor union to notify pensioners in writing 
that they are not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion benefits by reason of their retirement.s A resolve was adopted 
providing for a recess study of the coverage of public employees and 
employees in nonprofit institutions.4 
§13.22. Minimum wage law. The minimum wage law1 was 
amended in several respects. First, employees who are certified by the 
Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission as handicapped persons 
may be employed at less than the minimum wage rates.2 Second, the 
time-and-one-half provisions for work in excess of forty hours in one 
weekS were amended to exempt employees in nonprofit schools or 
colleges, and in seasonal businesses which are carried on for no more 
than four months per year, and for qualified trainees earning over $80 
per week; the regular rate for the computation of overtime was rede-
fined to exclude commissions, drawing accounts, bonuses, and incentive 
pay earned during the forty hours.4 At the same time the Governor 
vetoed a state minimum wage law raising the minimum to $1.15 and 
$1.25 per hour at the same time that the new federal minimum wages 
became effective.1I 
§13.23. Labor and industries law. The basic labor and industries 
law1 was amended in several minor respects. The Commissioner was 
again given the power for one year to suspend the operation of the 
law relative to the employment of women and minors.2 Contractors 
and subcontractors in the construction field must on request furnish 
detailed written information on wage deductions and contributions for 
pension, insurance, health and welfare, and apprentice training funds 
or plans.S Inspectors of the Department of Labor and Industries now 
are protected in enforcing all provisions of Chapter 149.4 They may 
now require dust removal devices in "all places of employment," Ii 
and "all places of employment'" may be entered by representatives of 
the department for enforcement of the chapter.6 The one day's rest in 
S Acts of 1961, c. 93. 
4 Resolves of 1961, c. 98. 
§13.22. 1 G.L., c. 151. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 272. 
8 Acts of 1960, c. 813. For a discussion of this law, see Segal, 1960 Labor Laws 
in Massachusetts, 5 Boston B.J. 15-16 Gan. 1961). 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 431. Clause (II) of this act is corrected by Acts of 1961, c. 576. 
II September 3, 1961, and September 3, 1963. 
§13.23. 1 G.L., c. 149. 
2 Acts of 1961, c. 84. 
8 Id., c. 400. Chapter 246 of the Acts of 1960 required information from all em-
ployers on wage deductions but did not cover contributions. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 43, provides a penalty for hindering inspectors in the enforce-
ment of all provisions of the chapter. 
Ii Acts of 1961, c. 438. 
6 Id., c. 585. 
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seven provisions were modified and corrected by two acts,7 and the 
hours of labor of women and of boys under eighteen and girls under 
twenty-one were further restricted by three acts passed during the 1961 
legislative session.S 
§13.24. Miscellaneous legislation. Several miscellaneous measures 
were also enacted during the 1961 legislative session. One requires 
that prospective purchasers of imported foreign goods be notified that 
the goods were imported.1 Another provides for a labor representative 
on housing and redevelopment boards.2 Two changes in the Sunday 
laws3 were made: (1) all the provisions of the Sunday laws were made 
applicable to October 12 as a full (rather than half) holiday,4 and (2) 
certain bakeryo products are permitted to be transported on Sunday 
and holidays.5 
7 Chapter 70 of the Acts of 1961 limits the broad exemption of drugstores from 
these provisions to pharmacists who work in drugstores. Chapter 47 of the Acts of 
1961 clarifies the provisions by making the penalty clause of Section 52 apply to 
Section 51 explicitly instead of to "the previous section," since a Section 51A, which 
carries no penalty, was added in 1954. 
8 Chapter 44 of the Acts of 1961 added beauty culture, weight reducing, and simi-
lar establishments to the list of establishments and occupations in which the hours 
of labor of women and children are restricted. Chapters 68 and 69 of the Acts of 
1961 applies the restrictions of the hours of labor of boys under eighteen and of 
girls under twenty-one to the establishments and occupations listed in Section 56 
as well as to those listed in Section 60. 
§13.24. 1 Acts of 1961, c. 172. 
2 Id., c. 496. 
3 G.L., c. 136. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 338. This puts eight holidays under the Sunday laws of Massa-
chusetts. 
5 Id., c. 412. 
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